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The present paper formulates a consensus moderation system based on the negotiation of the 
actors involved. There are a series of steps in the moderation process, the first of which is 
constructing a front of Pareto optimal solutions. Since this in itself will likely not lead to 
consensus in a real life scenario, Kaldor-Hicks compromises are then detected. Compromises 
are recommended at every iteration of the negotiation process which can lead to a lengthy 
negotiation time, which is addressed  by using a recommendation engine based on the 
previous behavior of the actor. 




A consensus moderation system would 
prove a valuable tool in the administration of 
negotiation between a small number of 
actors. In this paper I propose an approach to 
constructing consensus and propose the 
conceptual architecture of a system 
integrating this approach. 
There are several possible directions which 
such a system could explore, approaches 
which are briefly examined below. 
Simple collaborative approaches  are 
mechanisms created to facilitate the 
interaction of citizens. The construction of a 
common position which satisfies all the 
participants is not done by the system itself, 
as such a result is emergent from the 
interaction of the citizens themselves. 
It is very difficult to limit this category to a 
series of tools since practically any 
collaborative mechanism can be used to 
construct a common opinion. For example, 
any wiki software could be used as a political 
tool with the singular restriction of the goal 
followed by the majority of its users. 
As such, simple approaches rely more on the 
existence of pre-existing social mechanisms 
than on a technical solution. While they 
constitute useful tools in the creation of 
consensus, they could, at best, be used as 
support tools to a systemic approach. 
Statistical collaborative approaches involve a 
statistical approach to the interactions 
between users. The simplest way to apply 
such an approach would be to construct an 
aggregate opinion formulated by statistical 
means, such as averaging the scores users 
associate to certain proposals/comments. 
While this type of approaches does have 
some merits and has the benefit of 
realistically reflecting a classical democratic 
mechanism, it will generally not be enough 
to create complex integration and guarantee 
the construction of consensus. 
Approaches involving more evolved 
mechanisms try to construct a common 
opinion by including artificial intelligence 
mechanisms. 
In the context of artificial consensus 
moderation, I  will try to supplement the 
shortcomings of a simple system (which can 
be constructed to guarantee reaching a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
consensus) through the addition of a 
recommendation system which will try to 
emulate the decision strategies of the actors 
involved.  
 
2 Constructing consensus 
Through consensus moderation I understand 
an approach which tends to accelerate the 
convergence of the ideas of a population of 
users through some type of automatic 
mechanism. Although total convergence 
itself through an automatic mechanism is 
unlikely, the more efficient the system is, the 
higher the chances for consensus are. 
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The construction of a consensus moderation 
system is attempted through an abstract 
approach which allows us to analyze  the 
process of government as a system in which 
the relations between the actors involved can 
be analyzed and improved. 
Since laws relating the information 
technology are dependent in their application 
by wide industry acceptance, the system will 
allow these actors to reach an acceptable 
middle ground which, in turn, will eliminate 
some of the misgiving the actors involved 
have. 
If applied to larger entities proposed system 
will, on one hand, allow the citizens of a state 
to be directly involved in the construction of 
laws and, on the other hand, allow the state to 
rely on a solid democratic legitimacy. While 
the final purpose in this case is the one 
above, an intermediary system would involve 
actors to which a law is to be applied. For 
example, for the construction of a law 
concerning digital content provision, at least 
the major players on the market should be 
involved, alongside other important 
organizations, even if the ideal situation, in 
which all citizens have a distinct voice, is 
impossible. 
A consensus moderation system would help 
the parties involved, whichever they may be, 
in constructing a legal text which reflects the 
interests of all participants through a series of 
interdependent compromises. Such a system 
would produce a legal text which would 
serve either to legitimate the efforts of the 
legislator  or to show that the will of the 
people to whom the law is to be applied is 
opposite to the legal situation. 
In trying to achieve the construction of 
artificial consensus, several approaches 
relating to meta-government have been 
studied. A combination of these approaches 
is the best solution for such a system. 
Through the idea of consensus moderation 
we understand the construction of a network 
of compromises between the actors involved 
in the negotiation which allows these actors 
to reach a solution considered satisfactory by 
all of them. 
The concept on which the idea of moderation 
is built is that it is possible that in a 
negotiation with a sufficiently large number 
of actors an optimal solution might exist that 
the actors themselves are not aware of. The 
ideal system would come to the aid of the 
participants through the construction and 
recommendation of this ideal compromise 
solution. 
A moderation mechanism, as it is understood 
in this paper, represents two different 
concepts. On one hand, through “moderation 
mechanism” I  understand the general 
moderation methodology by which aiding the 
construction of consensus is approached. 
Under this definition, the moderation 
mechanism consists of a series of preliminary 
steps, such as decomposition of proposals, 
followed by a number of algorithms which 
are to be run in order to ensure the best 
chance of consensus being reached. 
On the other hand, by “moderation 
mechanism” I  understand the actual 
algorithm by which the proposal space is 
stabilized, in the sense that the actors are 
determined to group themselves around 
common opinions. 
There are a series of possible problems which 
must be taken into account when 
constructing  a prototype system. Some of 
these will be addressed in the following 
sections, while some are the possible subject 
of future research, as they go beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
The first problem the system will encounter 
is managing the issues the users raise in 
connection to a particular proposal. In order 
to maintain a higher chance for consensus to 
be reached, issues are not allowed to overlap. 
In a first phase each issue is discussed 
separately, before deciding to go into the 
compromise phase. The decision of splitting 
an issue is automated, although is origin is 
always one of the actors involved. 
Another important problem is separating the 
proposals, issues and solutions which are 
made “jocandi causa”, in the sense that they 
do not address real problems and they are 
raised in order to create perturbations in the 
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the event that such a system might be applied 
to small communities of regular citizens. In 
the study done in this paper, however, the 
actors are assumed to be large business 
entities which are more interested in reaching 
an acceptable compromise than in creating 
perturbations in the functioning of the 
system. 
A more important problem, however, is that 
the system must offer a solution for the cases 
where compromises cannot be reached. Since 
the very problem of consensus is its blocking 
character and the fact that trying to reach 
consensus might result in no text being 
adopted, this is one of the main issues with 
which the system must be concerned. 
While situations where consensus cannot be 
reached will still be possible, the objective of 
the system is to minimize the number of such 
occurrences and thus lead to a more effective 
negotiation process. 
If the system is to be used as a mechanism 
for confirming/infirming the democratic 
legitimacy of a state body, the only effective 
way of testing it is having it used by a large 
enough number of citizens. 
Since the system has its primary intended 
used for the negotiation between the state and 
large industry players, it can also be tested on 
a relatively small set of actors negotiating 
laws and regulations pertaining to a certain 
field. 
For this case, the system can be tested either 
in the actual negotiation between actors 
represented by a human “spokesperson” or 
via  a sufficiently defined set of agents 
simulating their behavior. 
 
3 Conceptual architecture of the system 
The actual system would have to integrate 
the steps described above, alongside classical 
collaborative mechanisms allowing for the 
effective communication between the parties 
involved. For the approach based on a 
predicted future behavior of the actors, the 
actions of the users would have to be stored 
in the system and used as input  for the 
recommendation engine. 
There are a series of steps which must be 
followed in the discussion of a proposal, 
steps which will be reflected in the sections 
below. 
The flow of the system is reflected in the 
Figure  1 below which reflects the steps 
through which a proposal must pass in order 
for consensus to be reached. As we can see, 
there are a series of steps that are followed in 
the flow of a proposal through the system. 
First the proposal is registered by a 
proponent with the system. The next step is 
for proponents to raise issues. 
If issues overlap, they must be decomposed 
in different, smaller issues, which will have 
the same proponents as the “parent” issue 
involved in the negotiation. 
For a defined issue, there is a particular 
lifecycle of its negotiation in the system, 
which is composed by a series of iterations 
through the negotiation procedure. For each 
iteration, there is a series of phases through 
which the proposal must pass. First 
proponents can then propose various 
solutions they envision.  After the solutions 
are registered with the system, they are then 
endorsed by the other proponents; each 
endorsement has an associated score, which 
can either be visible or invisible to the user. 
If there are several solutions for a particular 
issue, the system then tries to eliminate the 
subset of the solution which does not satisfy 
the Pareto optimality criterion. If, after 
eliminating the dominated solutions, there 
are still multiple solutions, possible 
compromises are proposed to the proponents 
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Fig. 1. Flow of the system 
 
In order to accomplish this, the possible 
compromises which satisfy the Kaldor Hicks 
optimality criterion are selected. While all 
these could be presented as possible ways of 
reaching consensus to the proponents, it is 
better to select only the compromises which 
are more likely to be accepted by a proponent 
(a fact which is determined according to their 
prior behavior). 
If the proponents accept the recommended 
compromises, the system removed the 
Kaldor Hicks dominated solutions.  
At this point, the system either has a possible 
consensus, or the system must go through 
another negotiation iteration. 
If consensus is possible, the proposal is said 
to be stable, providing it passes a final round 
of approval from the proponents. 
 
4 Pareto optimality of solutions 
The idea of using Pareto efficiency as a 
necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for the 
construction of consensus has been used 
before [1]. The principle that leads to the use 
of such an approach stems from the principle 
of Pareto optimality, since a dominated 
proposal would not have lead to greater 
opinion convergence. 
Through opinion convergence I  understand 
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involved in the negotiations agree with 
certain proposal. The goal of optimizing 
convergence is to finally reach a single 
opinion which satisfies the parties and thus 
reach general consensus. 
The concept of Pareto efficiency [9] [10] is 
an economic concept, but has also 
historically been used in social sciences. 
Pareto efficiency is a minimal notion of 
efficiency and does not necessarily result in a 
socially desirable distribution of resources: it 
makes  no statement about equality, or the 
overall well-being of a society.  
However, a Pareto inefficient system is to be 
avoided since if a reallocation of resources is 
likely to make some individuals’ situation 
better without harming the others, it is clear 
that the situation of the whole population of 
agents can be improved. 
Given an initial allocation of goods among a 
set of individuals, a change to a different 
allocation that makes at least one individual 
better off without making any other 
individual worse off is called a Pareto 
improvement.  
An allocation is defined as “Pareto efficient” 
or “Pareto optimal” when no further Pareto 
improvements can be made (thus there are no 
obvious improvements to the situation of any 
participant). 
If economic allocation in any system is not 
Pareto efficient, there is potential for a Pareto 
improvement (an increase in Pareto 
efficiency): through reallocation, 
improvements to at least one participant's 
well-being can be made without reducing any 
other participant's well-being. 
Using the classical “butter vs. guns” example 
a Pareto efficient situation appears in the 
figure below where applying Pareto 
optimality leads to a production curve. 
Point A is not efficient in production because 
you can produce more of either one or both 
goods (Butter and Guns) without producing 
less of the other. Thus, moving from A to D 
enables you to make one person better off 
without making anyone else worse off (rise 
in Pareto efficiency). Moving to point B from 
point A, however, is not Pareto efficient, as 
less butter is produced. Likewise, moving to 
point C from point A is not Pareto efficient, 
as fewer guns are produced. A point on the 
frontier curve with the same x or y 
coordinate will be Pareto efficient [6]. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Production-possibility frontier [2] 
 
When discussing Pareto optimality, two 
concepts must be taken into account, that of a 
weak Pareto optimum and a strong Pareto 
optimum. A “weak Pareto optimum” (WPO) 
satisfies the condition of not being Pareto 
inferior to a different allocation of the 
resources, but the definition of a possible 
improvement differs from the case of a 
“strong Pareto optimum”. 
For a WPO to be reached, it is sufficient that 
no other allocation is strictly preferred by all 
other individuals. This might mean that there 
exists a different allocation that improves the 
situation of part of the individuals while 
leaving the situation of the others unchanged, 
but such an allocation is not covered in 
searching for a WPO. In other words, a WPO 
is reached when no reallocation  exists that 
will cause all individuals to gain. 
Weak Pareto-optimality is “weaker”  than 
strong Pareto-optimality in the sense that the 
conditions for WPO status are “weaker” than 
those for SPO status: any allocation that can 
be considered an SPO will also qualify as a 
WPO, but a WPO allocation won't 
necessarily qualify as an SPO [6]. 
A “strong Pareto optimum”, on the other 
hand, is reached when there are no other 
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individuals to gain while not deteriorating the 
situation of any other individuals. As such, a 
reallocation that leads to a SPO might be 
strictly preferred by some individuals (those 
whose situation is actually improved), but 
non strictly preferred by the rest  (those 




Fig. 3. Pareto frontier [3] 
 
Figure  3  shows an example of a Pareto 
frontier. All the squares in the figure  are 
possible choices with smaller values 
preferred to larger ones. As an example, 
moving the frontier to point C would not be 
preferable from a Pareto point of view as it is 
dominated by points A and B. 
In order to obtain consensus in the 
negotiation of a particular issue, it is useful to 
bring the possible solutions to a state of 
Pareto optimality. This will mean that all 
participants obtain maximum possible 
satisfaction under the restriction that no 
dissenting participant’s opinion can be 
ignored. 
The system attempts to create Pareto 
optimality for each issue before trying to 
reconcile between issues that could not 
successfully be brought to consensus through 
this minimal criterion. 
A possible solution S1 approved by a set of 
users U1 to an issue is dominated if there is 
another solution S2 that has been approved 






The steps in trying to achieve  Pareto 
optimality in the solution space are presented 
in the algorithm below. These steps will be 
run for each generation of the algorithm. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Removing dominated solutions 
 
Once dominated solutions have been 
eliminated, the system might reach a stable 
state, in which there is a dominant solution 
for each proposed issue. However, this will 
most likely not be the case, so the next step is 
to identify possible compromises. If these are 
accepted, opinion convergence will be 
increased in that there will be less contested 
issues within a proposal. 
 
5 Constructing Kaldor Hicks compromises 
Pareto efficient systems are hard to attain in 
social systems so usually Pareto efficiency is 
used as a baseline test for compromise based 
systems. 
Since from the previous section the system is 
in the situation that it cannot lead the system 
to consensus, we must widen the search for 
possible solutions. In order to achieve this, 
one possible approach is using the Kaldor 
Hicks criterion which relaxes the conditions 
of searching for Pareto improvements in 
order to better apply to real life situation. 
The Kaldor Hicks criterion has been widely 
applied in the field of welfare economics [4] 
to create actual policies when changes were 
required which could not be conceived as 
Algorithm: 
P1.Select solution S1 
P2.Select solution S2 form S\{S1} 
P3.If S1 dominates S2 remove S2 from 
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Pareto reallocations. An important note 
however is that using the Kaldor Hicks 
criterion for policy construction is subject to 
controversy  since there is no way of 
guaranteeing that the compensation the 
“losers” should gain is actually distributed to 
them. 
I believe however, that in the situation that is 
covered in the consensus moderation system, 
the criterion can be applied while 
circumventing these limitations. For one, 
compensation is automated since all 
“transactions” happen inside the system. 
Another important element is that all actors 
are supposed to  be aware of the way the 
system functions which lessens the 
probability of an actor accepting a 
compromise where it is not compensated. 
Nevertheless, Kaldor Hicks improvements 
should be handled with care, as not all of 
them also lead to Pareto optimality. This can 
be seen in the figure below [5]. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Kaldor-Hicks improvements [5] 
 
As can be seen from the figure above, 
represented by the green area, only a small 
subset of Kaldor Hicks improvements 
actually lead to a more Paretto efficient 
situation. 
The red area represents possible 
compromises which lead to at least one party 
being worse off and thus do not meet the 
criteria of balance which I am trying to 
achieve in the system. 
In order for an improvement to meet the 
Kaldor Hicks criterion, two conditions must 
be met: 
That the party “winning” from the 
compromise can adequately compensate the 
parties “losing” in order for them to not be 
worse off after the redistribution 
That the parties “losing” from the 
compromise could not have adequately 
compensated the winner 
In effect, any redistribution which fits the 
Kaldor Hicks criterion must be unidirectional 
and not worsen the situation of any party. As 
stated above, redistributions must also be of 
such a nature as to ensure that compensation 
actually happens. This is because the 
criterion only requires that compensation be 
possible, not that it is actually played. This is 
less of a problem in an automated system 
where compensations happed without a party 
having the chance of actually not fulfilling 
their obligations. 
Searching for Kaldor Hicks compromises is 
presented in the equations below, which 
attempt to formalize the construction of 
compromise between actors discussing 
multiple issues. 
The equation below  defines the issue set, 
which is represented as a set of solutions 





Apart from the issue set, we must also 
represent the set of the users involved in the 
negotiations. All variables noted u should be 




In order to reflect the attitude of a user 
towards a solution proposed to a particular 
issue, we must introduce a preference 
function (ipref), which is defined below. 
There are two possible forms for the 
function, the binary form and the extended 
one used here. While a binary preference 
function is sufficient in order to reflect Pareto 
dominance of solutions, it would be 160    Informatica Economică vol. 15, no. 3/2011 
 
impossible to reflect the “price” a 





0,𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑖,𝑗  
𝑛 > 0,𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑖,𝑗
  
 
We define the set of endorsing users for a 
particular solution as E. This content of each 
set is dependent both on the solution and the 
issue it is offered for. In defining E, it is only 
relevant that a particular set of users has 
manifested some degree of approval, but not 
the actual level of approval they provided. 
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑗 = �𝑢𝑘�𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓�𝑢𝑘,𝑆𝑖,𝑗� > 0,𝑢𝑘 ∈ 𝑈� 
 
There is a connection between the sets of 
endorsing users and solution domination in 
the Pareto sense.  The concept of solution 
domination only has relevance for solutions 
proposed for the same issue. A solution Si,j 
dominates another solution Si,k  if the 
corresponding endorsing set for Si,j includes 
the corresponding endorsing set for Si,k. 
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑗 ⊂ 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 ⇒ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗 ≺ 𝑆𝑖,𝑘 
 
Apart from the set of users endorsing a 
solution, in order to construct a compromise, 
we must have the set of users who do not 
agree with the solution, even to a minimal 
extent. Hence their preference for the 
solution must be 0. 
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑗 = �𝑢𝑘�𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓�𝑢𝑘,𝑆𝑖,𝑗� = 0,𝑢𝑘 ∈ 𝑈� 
 
The next step is to actually detect possible 
Kaldor Hicks compromises, which will then 
be recommended by taking into account prior 
user behavior. 
The set of Pareto dominant solutions for an 
issue is represented by solutions which are 
not dominated by any other solutions 
proposed for the same issue, as seen in the 
equation below. 
 
𝑃𝑖 = �𝑆𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝑖�∄𝑆𝑖,𝑘 ∈ 𝐼𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑆𝑖,𝑘 ≻ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗� 
A series of conditions must be satisfied in 
order for a compromise to be possible. The 
first conditions are fairly obvious. As seen in 
the equation below, the solution we are 
trying to build a compromise for cannot be 
Pareto dominant. 
 
𝑆𝑖,𝑗 ∉ 𝑃𝑖 
 
Secondly, one of the users, the prospective 
“winner” of the compromise  (henceforth 
called the consenting user), must approve of 
the selected solution. 
 
𝑢𝑘 ∈ 𝐸𝑖,𝑗 
 
Thirdly, the user  (henceforth called “the 
dissenting user”)  we are trying to 
compromise with must not approve of the 
solution. This is somewhat misleading, as the 
second user is in fact the subject of the 
search, as it is described below. 
 
𝑢𝑙 ∈ 𝐸 �𝑖,𝑗 
 
With the two users selected, we must define 
the condition which makes the compromise 
possible. Although the solution is not 
dominant, it would become dominant if the 
dissenting user would approve. Lacking this 
condition, the user is not vital to the approval 
of the solution and is thus not relevant to the 
search for a compromise.  
However, it must be noted that the model can 
be extended for compromises between more 
than two users. Indeed, this approach should 
be pursued if compromises between two 
users are not available.  
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑗
′ = 𝐸𝑖,𝑗⋃{𝑢𝑙} ⇒ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 
 
Since we know our dissenting user’s 
approval would lead to the solution’s 
becoming dominant (in this context we will 
say that the user is vital for the approval), we 
must now find something to trade for the 
approval. As such, we are interested in 
solutions that the dissenting user has Informatica Economică vol. 15, no. 3/2011    161 
 
approved on other issue and which are 
dependent of the consenting user’s approval. 
In order to find the set of possible 
compromises (CS), it is necessary to select 
all solutions to which the preference of the 
consenting user is 0 and the preference of the 
dissenting user is strictly positive. 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑘,𝑙 = �𝑆𝑚,𝑛�𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓�𝑢𝑙,𝑆𝑚,𝑛� > 0,𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓�𝑢𝑘,𝑆𝑚,𝑛� = 0� 
 
The condition contained in the definition of 
the CS set  is not, however, sufficient. The 
simple fact that the preferences of the two 
users differ does not guarantee that the 
consenting user is vital to those solution’s 
domination. The condition included in the 
definition of the C (vital compromises) set 
reflects this by making it necessary that the 
consenting user’s approval would push the 
solution into the dominant solutions’ set. We 




𝐶𝑘,𝑙 = �𝑆𝑚,𝑛 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑘,𝑙�𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓�𝑢𝑘,𝑆𝑖,𝑗� > 𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓�𝑢𝑙,𝑆𝑚,𝑛�,𝐸𝑚,𝑛
′ = 𝐸𝑚,𝑛⋃{𝑢𝑘} ⇒ 𝑆𝑚,𝑛
′ ∈ 𝑃 𝑚� 
 
One more condition must be taken into 
account for the compromise to be viable. 
Although The set C  contains possible 
compromises which are vital to both users, 
we do not have the guarantee that  the 
compromise is desirable. Hence, the 
preference of the “winning” user must be 
larger than that of the “losing” user, in order 
for compensation to be possible. 
While between two users the idea of 
compensation is simplified, the model can be 
easily  extended to multiple users. The 
equations remain largely the same, with the 
exception of the condition for compensation 
which must be updated the condition that the 
preference of the winning user must 
outweigh the sum of the preferences of the 
losing users. 
 




The consenting user no longer has to 
compensate a single user, but multiple users, 
whose compromises were necessary for the 
approval of the solution. 
Compromises are proposed iteratively 
through the lifecycle of an issue. Due to this, 
getting enough approval from the various 
parties involved in order to actually reach 
consensus might take a prohibitively large 
amount of time. 
As such, there has to be a way to select those 
compromises which present the largest 
chance of being accepted. This can be done 
by employing a recommendation engine that 
takes into account the users’ prior behavior. 
 
6 Using an action recommendation engine 
Since the using a condition such as leading 
the solution space towards a Paretto optimal 
state or introducing the idea of compromise 
through a Kaldor-Hicks model does not 
guarantee consensus, a mechanism should be 
introduced which will facilitate grouping of 
individuals with similar stances. This has a 
significant chance of reducing the number of 
solutions through classic social mechanisms 
(which are outside the system), in the sense 
that individuals with similar preferences 
might elect to support each other in order to 
achieve a greater negotiation strength. 
On the other sense, a recommendation 
system can be used to recommend which 
solutions, if accepted, would lead to large 
scale convergence, or in simpler terms, 
which solutions increase the chance of 
creating a viable network of compromises. 
As a last resort, this would prove useful in 
applying a traditional democratic mechanism, 
based on a vote of the majority. 
Since recommendation engines are a popular 
topic due to their large impact on the revenue 
of internet based businesses, an exhaustive 
approach of this topic is outside the scope of 162    Informatica Economică vol. 15, no. 3/2011 
 
this paper. For a much more detailed look at 
the recommendation engine actually used in 
the system, see [7] [8]. 
 
5 Conclusions 
A consensus moderation system would 
constitute a useful tool in the negotiation 
between a small number of actors. Consensus 
in itself serves as a decision mechanism 
which greatly increases the legitimacy of 
decisions since all the actors involved have 
agreed to the final act. 
Establishing consensus would be aided by 
the automatic tool presented in the current 
paper which would assist participants in 
aggregating their opinion. 
In order to build such a tool, mechanisms 
borrowed from welfare economics can be 
employed. The concepts of Pareto 
domination of proposed solutions and Kaldor 
Hicks compromises increase the chances of 
opinion aggregation. 
However, since the main interest is to 
accelerate the process, a recommendation 
engine which takes into account prior actor 
behaviour should be employed. 
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